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Abstract—Cryptographic access control tools for online social
networks (CACTOS) allow users to enforce their privacy settings
online without relying on the social network provider or any other
third party. Many such tools have been proposed in the literature,
some of them implemented and currently publicly available, and
yet they have seen poor or no adoption at all. In this paper
we investigate which obstacles may be hindering the adoption of
these tools. To this end, we perform a user study to inquire users
about key issues related to the desirability and general perception
of CACTOS. Our results suggest that, even if social network
users would be potentially interested in these tools, several issues
would effectively obstruct their adoption. Participants in our
study perceived that CACTOS are a disproportionate means to
protect their privacy online. This in turn may have been motivated
by the explicit use of cryptography or the fact that users do not
actually share on social networks the type of information they
would feel the need to encrypt. Moreover, in this paper we point
out to several key elements that are to be considered for the
improvement and better usability of CACTOS.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last 10 years, the success of online social networks
(OSN) has raised significant privacy concerns. The wealth
of data that can be collected by OSN providers has raised
questions regarding the balance of power between data subjects
and data holders, their respective trade-offs, and how to bal-
ance their respective interests. Computer scientists and security
engineers have developed cryptography-based access control
tools for OSNs (CACTOS) [6], [19], [25], [33], aimed at pro-
viding users greater control over privacy in OSNs. These tools
are grounded on robust security foundations that try to provide
the average Internet user with greater autonomy and freedom
from online surveillance. The designers of these tools often
present them as especially needed in OSNs given the sensitive
nature of the information shared on these platforms. Users
upload information related to private realms of their lives,
stored and processed by the service providers of these plat-
forms, in some cases without the users’ awareness or informed
consent [3]. CACTOS can also solve more mundane privacy
problems, such as preventing employers from finding out about
blatant criticism from their employees or avoiding that parents
intrude the social space of their children. However, existing
tools —even those which are free and publicly available—
have seen little adoption in practice [2], [34]. Security and
privacy experts have hinted at possible explanations why OSN
users lack interest in privacy technologies. Some argue that
there is scarce interest for privacy enhancing technologies —
or, more broadly, for protecting privacy— in OSNs —which
are meant for sharing and communicating [21]. Others point
at the poor understanding of privacy problems that many
users have [26]. Another plausible explanation anchors the
problems in the (lacking) usability of these tools, that prevents
users from being able to use them. Despite the wealth of
user studies related to privacy on OSNs, little research has
been done so far on the perceptions and attitudes of users
towards CACTOS [34].
In this paper, we report on the results of a user study aimed
at discovering the hitches and obstacles to the adoption of
CACTOS. We have investigated participants’ attitudes towards
the “privacy properties” CACTOS aim to provide, such as the
protection of communication content from the service provider
itself and additional controls over users’ information flows
without the burden of relying on a third party for enforcement.
In the execution of our study, we provide participants with an
access control tool for Facebook called Scramble! [6] in order
to discuss their attitudes with respect to a concrete CACTOS.
Hence, our goal and focus are less to perform a usability
study of a specific tool, and more to investigate users attitudes
towards the privacy properties and benefits of cryptographic
privacy preserving tools for OSNs. Still, usability is a key
factor on users’ attitudes towards a given tool. Hence, in
our work we try to separate the impact of usability from
users’ attitudes towards privacy properties, and still unveil
usability issues that result in recommendations for better, more
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usable, cryptographic tools. The study results suggest that OSN
users perceive CACTOS as disproportionate and inefficient for
protecting online privacy —either because of high costs “av-
erage end-users” associate with learning, adopting, and using
cryptographic tools, or because of the low benefit expected
in comparison to alternative privacy enhancing strategies [22],
e.g., self-censorship. Despite these results, it is possible to draw
from the study suggestions towards designing more usable and
useful CACTOS.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sect. II we re-
view the literature relevant to our research. In Sect. III we
provide the set of definitions and terminology that we use
throughout the paper. In Sect. IV we describe the goals of
the user study and the experimental setting. We describe our
analysis methodology in Sect. V and present our results in
Sect. VI. Lastly, we discuss the main findings of our study and
provide recommendations for the design of better CACTOS in
Sect. VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy Preserving Tools for Online Social Networks
Computer scientists and security researchers have proposed
a wide range of privacy preserving tools for OSNs. The mech-
anisms these tools rely on vary widely. Some of them piggy
back on existing OSN infrastructures —either relying solely on
the existing infrastructure [6], [14] or complimenting them
with external infrastructures [33]. Other tools are based on
“alternative” or decentralized architectures, and require users
to migrate from their current OSNs to new platforms [5], [11],
[15]. Despite the differences, these tools share a common goal:
to allow users to control who has access to their content on
an OSN (e.g., personal information, posts, messages) without
the need to depend on the service provider’s privacy controls.
This also implies that the OSN provider is barred from gaining
access to the users’ content. In sum, these tools undo the
delegation of access control enforcement to OSN providers
by taking advantage of cryptographic properties. Despite the
mathematically and technically undergirded “privacy proper-
ties” that these tools guarantee, to the best of our knowledge,
none of them have experienced significant adoption.
B. User Attitudes and Perception towards Privacy
Many researchers have studied users’ attitudes towards pri-
vacy. Acquisti and Grossklags [4] found supporting evidence
for the dichotomy between privacy attitudes and behaviour.
Lampinen et al. [23] performed a study on the attitudes of
OSN users towards context collision, and the strategies of
users to manage this problem. Besmer et al. [7] examined the
privacy issues that users encounter when sharing photos in
OSNs, finding out that these issues were motivated by iden-
tity and impression management. Raynes-Goldie [27] studied
how Facebook users understand and tackle privacy problems,
finding out that users are more concerned about controlling
access to personal information than to how Facebook uses and
processes that information. Xu et al. [36] revealed that users’
privacy concerns are not solely determined by their individual
perceptions and attitudes, but also informed by organizational
factors such as privacy policies. Our study differs, in that we
study user attitudes towards using CACTOS to protect their
privacy in the context of OSNs.
C. Usability Studies of Cryptographic Tools
Usability, defined as ease of use, is a key factor to ensure
that a certain tool is adopted. Previous research has shown
that this property is especially critical in the case of crypto-
graphic tools. The complexity and obscureness of cryptography
makes most crypto tools difficult to use. Whitten and Tygar’s
seminal study on the usability of PGP [35] pointed to several
design flaws that would prevent the general Internet user from
successfully using PGP. The authors blamed the inadequacy
of general user interface design principles for security tools,
which result in dangerous mistakes, such as users sending
secrets without encrypting them first. Fahl et al. [17] performed
an analysis of privacy preserving tools for OSNs and a usability
study of existing approaches. They found that users tend
to prefer tools that minimally disrupt their user experience.
Our results support this finding. We provide evidence that
users desire seamless, nearly automatic integration between
the access control tool and the social network.
Lastly, based on previous user studies, Vemou and Karyda
provide a classification of factors that may affect the low
adoption of privacy preserving tools for OSNs [34]; such as
unawareness of privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) or the
fact that users lack the technical skills required to use PETs.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Definitions and Terminology
We informally refer to content to denote the different bits of
data a user keeps on an OSN, such as messages, posts, photos
and any other types of media. We refer to privacy settings to
denote any set of mechanisms that define access control rules
over the content of a user in an OSN —that is, they allow
users to express who should be able to access their content.
We define unintended recipients as any person or entity that,
according to a set of privacy settings, is not authorized by the
user to access a certain piece of content (e.g., a post) on the
OSN. Lastly, we refer to Cryptographic Access Control Tools
for Online Social Networks (CACTOS) to denote any tool that
tries to address privacy problems that arise due to the following
design decisions:
• Delegation of privacy settings enforcement: users ex-
pect or need to rely on the OSN to enforce their
privacy settings.
• Disclosure of all content to service provider: all user
content is by default disclosed to the OSN provider
and it is not possible to express access control rules
towards the OSN provider.
In this paper, we refer to these as SNP-problems.
The objective of designers in developing CACTOS is to
mitigate SNP-problems by (1) allowing users to enforce their
privacy settings independently of the mechanisms already
available on the OSN, (2) allowing users to do so without
relying on the provider or any other third parties, (3) allowing
users to prevent the service provider or other third parties from
accessing their content. Throughout this paper we refer to these
features as CACTOS-properties.
Further, we consider that users may adopt CACTOS for a
variety of reasons. Users may want (a) to keep their content
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confidential from the OSN provider, i.e., have the option to set
access control rules that apply to the OSN provider. This may
also be used (b) to guarantee that the user’s content cannot be
indexed by the OSN or any other parties. Users may want (c) to
delegate the enforcement of their privacy settings to the OSN
provider no more. This may be due to past experiences with the
OSN provider, i.e., the latter may have changed the semantics
of the privacy settings or the defaults in undesirable ways or
applied unreasonable rules to (new) features leading to privacy
violations. Last, users may want (d) to have greater granularity
in setting new access control rules, being CACTOS’ access
control rules more expressive than those of the OSN provider.
We will compare these reasons against the privacy problems
currently perceived by OSN users to assess whether CACTOS
could effectively help OSN users mitigating those problems.
Lastly, we note that the definitions above are informal, i.e.,
we do not attempt to formalise or establish strict limits for any
of the concepts above. Rather, we provide these definitions
to loosely summarize the objectives behind CACTOS design,
to define the scope of this study (as our findings may have
implications beyond the tools considered here), and to improve
the readability of this paper.
B. Scramble!
Scramble! [6] is a publicly available CACTOS tool devel-
oped by security engineers as a browser plug-in (concretely, a
Firefox extension).1 Scramble! features a hybrid cryptosystem
(based on OpenPGP [12]) to enforce access control lists [28].
This allows Scramble! to enforce privacy settings indepen-
dently of the OSN provider. Even if Scramble! features a stan-
dard interface design, usability testing, as is typical to many
CACTOS, was mostly limited to the immediate environment
of the designers of the tool and was not systematically part
of the development. Scramble! can be installed as any other
Firefox extension. After installation, users need to initialise
the tool, which involves generating (or importing) a pair of
public-private keys. Users then need to add their friends’
public keys to Scramble!’s key ring; either by asking Scramble!
to perform a lookup in a public key server or by loading
them from a local file. After the initialisation, Scramble! is
ready to use. To encrypt a message before they post it to
the OSN, users select the text of the message and choose
Scramble! on the right-click drop down menu. This makes a
window appear, where users can choose the people they wish to
encrypt the message for. Afterwards, Scramble! automatically
replaces the plaintext with its corresponding cypthertext, which
the user can then post to the OSN. That way, all the user’s
communications are stored encrypted on the server of the OSN.
This provides several benefits: users do not need to trust the
OSN provider to guarantee the confidentiality of their content,
they do not need an alternative trusted server to store their
data, and they can independently manage who is able to access
their information. Furthermore, Scramble! provides automatic
decryption (whenever users have the right cryptographic keys
to decrypt the content), releasing users from the burden of
dealing with the decryption of messages.
1Both the Firefox extension and the source code can be downloaded at
http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/scramble/
IV. THE STUDY
A. Goals
The ultimate goal of the study presented in this paper is
to gain insight into the reasons that can foster or hamper
the adoption of CACTOS. To this end, we set out to assess
whether OSN users share designers’ attitudes towards the
importance of and the best ways to mitigate SNP-problems.
Specifically, we wanted to find out whether OSN users (Q1)
share the concerns of CACTOS designers with respect to SNP-
problems; (Q2) think they should be responsible for taking
measures to mitigate the SNP-problems; (Q3) think they
should use a (technical) tool to address SNP-problems, and
(Q4) comprehend and agree with the way CACTOS address
SNP-problems.
To address these questions, we performed a user study
consisting of two questionnaires and a guided tour to a
CACTOS (Scramble!). Through the questionnaires, we (S1)
asked participants about their privacy problems on OSNs,
and assessed whether they relate to SNP-problems; (S2)
asked participants about what they feel personally responsible
towards protecting their privacy, and assessed whether their
answers relate to SNP-problems; (S3) asked participants about
the strategies they use to tackle SNP-problems, and assessed
if these strategies overlap with CACTOS-properties; (S4)
asked participants about their experience using one CACTOS
(Scramble!), and assessed whether they find these tools useful
and appropriate.
B. Study Design
Our study consisted in three phases: an entry questionnaire,
a guided tour to Scramble!, and an exit questionnaire.
1. The goal of the entry questionnaire was to address
questions Q1, Q2 and Q3. This questionnaire consisted in 36
questions2 of which, given space limitations, we only analyse
a subset in this paper.
2. The goal of the guided tour to Scramble! was to provide
participants with a hands-on experience of a concrete imple-
mentation of a CACTOS, thus providing them with an example
to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of such tools. We
expected this evaluation would hint to possible obstacles that
hinder the adoption of CACTOS by revealing discrepancies
between users’ communication needs and the communication
models inherent to CACTOS. We chose Scramble! for this tour
because it features the basic CACTOS-properties, its source
code is freely available and we could rely on the assistance of
his main developer, Filipe Beato.
Because we wanted participants to evaluate Scramble! in
the context of the SNP-problems it tries to solve (S4), we
provided them, right before the guided tour, with a short
list of potential privacy issues arising from SNP-problems
on Facebook. This list included issues such as: the fact that
Facebook has access to all the information they upload to
the site; that privacy settings afford little protection against
system vulnerabilities or someone breaking into Facebook; that
2 Due to space limitations, rather than providing the full list of questions
of the questionnaires in the annex, we transcribe each of the questions inline
when we present the results.
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users can change the settings but need to rely on Facebook
to properly enforce them, or that Facebook could reveal their
information to third parties. Afterwards, we gave participants
a manual to use Scramble!, including both an introduction to
what Scramble! is and how it works and the instructions for
the guided tour.3
The tour involved all the steps that a new Scramble! user
needs to follow to be able to use the tool. Therefore, users were
guided through the download and installation process and then
provided with instructions on how to encrypt messages. After
the installation, participants were encouraged to send encrypted
messages to one or more participants in the same session, and
hold a brief conversation.
One may wonder why we designed a guided tour instead of
a traditional usability environment in which participants are re-
quired to perform a set of tasks on their own. Previous research
has shown that users often have a hard time using encryption
technologies, specifically at first contact (i.e., learning from
scratch) [17], [31], [35]. In the case of Scramble! we feared a
similar outcome; and also usability testing was not our main
objective. Hence, we guided users step-by-step on the usage of
the tool. Usability experts may fear that this decision may have
affected the ability of the participants to judge Scramble! based
on its ease of use. However, usability is just one of the factors
that may affect the adoption of CACTOS [34]. Moreover, we
show in Sect. VI that, in spite of the guidance, participants
raised numerous usability issues. Hence, incidentally, we also
provide suggestions towards improving the usability of Scram-
ble!.
3. The goal of the exit questionnaire was to address
question Q4. It consisted of a total of 11 questions4 plus
the system usability scale (SUS), based on a 10-item attitude
Likert scale, a widely used metric in usability studies [10].
SUS yields a score between 0 and 100, allowing a quick,
coarse evaluation of usability. This allowed us to perform a
sanity check on the degree of usability of Scramble!, although
we insist that this was only a secondary objective of our study.
C. Study Setup
The phases mentioned above occurred in a laboratory
environment during the first week of September 2013. At
arrival, participants were instructed to log into one of the 8
available computers in the laboratory and received an email
with a link to the entry questionnaire. They were given 15
minutes to complete it, at which point they received the
documentation for the guided tour to Scramble!. They had 30
minutes for the tour. Then, they received a second email with
the link to the exit questionnaire, to be completed within 10
minutes.
We invited 52 students (42% female, average age = 21.5,
SD = 2.6) from the Center for Behavioral Decision Research
Pool at Carnegie Mellon University to participate in a study
to “Test Scramble! - A Facebook app.” Participants were paid
$10. All participants had been using Facebook for at least 2
years and identified themselves as active Facebook users.
3If needed, all the documentation is available from the first author.
4See footnote 2
V. SURVEY ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
The main purpose of the analysis was to find common
features or patterns in the participants’ responses. For instance,
after asking participants if they found Scramble! to be a
useful tool and why, we categorized their responses based on
patterns in their justifications. In summary, our methodology
was largely inspired by the method of emergent coding [24].
Emergent coding is especially useful to work on a topic for
which there is limited prior research, as it is the case of user
studies for CACTOS.
Specifically, during the first round of analysis, we devel-
oped codes to capture the essence of each of the responses
individually. Each code, which consisted in one or two key-
words, summarized the key points in a given response. For
this first round of coding, we heavily relied on in-vivo codes,
namely, terms provided by the participants themselves that
summarise accurately the concept they are referring to. During
the second round of coding we used thematic, hierarchical
coding. This involved grouping the in-vivo codes in themes that
emerged during the first round. Themes were in turn grouped
into more general, broad themes, until we found that further
generalisation was not possible or made no sense.
There are some caveats that are typical to such a study [32].
Throughout the presentation of the results we refer to the con-
cepts that emerged from the analysis. However, these concepts
were not drawn from previous theory (e.g., [34]) but rather
resulted from our own interpretation. In order to contextualize
our analysis in the responses, for each category we quote our
study subjects. On the other hand, in the discussion of our
results we heavily rely on research-denoted concepts. There
we also only provide our own interpretation and opinion of
the implications of this study.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our study. We use
“quotation marks” to refer to questions in the questionnaire and
both “italics and quotation marks” to refer to participants’ re-
sponses. We place the participants’ quotes between parentheses
when we give several examples of a certain attitude, perception
or position.
Further, note that even though the objective of the study
is not to provide quantitative results, at times we mention
numbers to indicate whether articulated positions were voiced
by a majority or a small minority of the participants.
A. Responsibility vs Control (Q1, Q2)
Following strategies S1 and S2, we explored whether
users would be interested in having control over their privacy
as enabled by CACTOS-properties (S1), and compared it to
whether they feel responsible for taking measures to mitigate
SNP-problems (S2). To test the former, we asked participants
“Who should decide...?” for a set of decisions related to the
visibility of their data on Facebook such as “[who should
decide] who is able to see what you post on the site?”
or “who is able to see your personal details (age, phone
number, hometown, etc)?”. For each decision, users were
able to choose among the following options: You, Facebook,
or Others - Please specify. Multiple choice selections were
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allowed. For all decisions but one, most participants thought
that they should have control over those decisions themselves,
being the average percentage of You and Facebook across
all decisions M = 81.3% (SD = 12.9%) and M = 23.9%
(SD = 14.1%), respectively. This is consistent with previous
research suggesting that users desire control over personal
information, even though they may not actually make use of
that control [8]. This desire for control seemingly clashes with
the unwillingness of participants to be the only responsible for
many privacy-related issues we proposed to them. Following
S2, we asked participants “Who should be responsible for the
following [privacy related] decisions?” such as “setting the
proper privacy settings on your profile” or “making sure private
companies do not have access to the data you post to the site
without your permission.” Most participants considered that
Facebook should be responsible for issues such as “making
sure your privacy settings work” or “making sure strangers
cannot see your photos/posts online.” Since these are matters
that are outside of the authority of the users, it is not surprising
that most of the study participants saw these matters as part
of the responsibility of service providers. However, a few
participants declared that Facebook should be responsible for
“setting the proper privacy settings on your profile” or even
“making sure your friends do not post photos of you that you
do not like.” In general, most users attributed to Facebook
greater responsibility than control. Across all decisions, the
percentage of You and Facebook was M = 67.4% (SD = 21.1%)
and M = 52.2% (SD = 27.8%), respectively. Furthermore, we
noticed certain trends in how users assigned responsibility.
Users attributed to Facebook the responsibility for issues such
as “preventing strangers from logging in to your account” and
“preventing people other than your friends from reading your
messages and seeing your photos,” (and more generally, issues
that are out of their control by default on Facebook), whereas
they attributed to themselves the responsibility for “what your
friends can see in your profile.” (and more generally, matters
for which Facebook provides privacy controls).
Regardless of the amount of control users desire over their
privacy, they may not consider themselves responsible for
the SNP-problems tackled by CACTOS. Following S2, we
asked participants “On Facebook, what do you feel responsible
for with respect to your own privacy?” Participants’ answers
varied widely but can be classified in two main categories:
what they post, and how they use the functionalities provided
by Facebook. Answers belonging in the first category were the
majority (47%). Participants referred to the nature of the con-
tent they post on Facebook and, specifically, to self-censorship
practices, e.g., “I am responsible for not posting very intimate
and personal photos [...]”, “I [...] feel responsible for the kind
of posts and personal information I put up online”. Answers
in the second category referred to practices such as “getting
my privacy settings right”, “the access I set for each of
my photos/posts etc.” as well as other options provided by
Facebook such as “making sure that people who I don’t wish
to have contact with are blocked” or “making sure that my
profile is not [...] able to be searched on google”. Moreover,
some participants suggested that they are not responsible for
making sure that the privacy settings are actually enforced
according to their preference —rather, they answered, that
this is Facebook’s duty. For instance, one participant wrote:
“[Block people. I]t is then facebook’s job to make sure that
they cannot message me from that point on”, or “I am not the
one who can guarantee the execution of [the privacy settings],
Facebook does it. At this level what choice do I have? To trust
Facebook”. Interestingly, respondents often referred to feeling
responsible for managing photos, links, comments they post
but not the private communications they take part in. In fact,
some participants explicitly mentioned that Facebook’s private
domain falls beyond the scope of their responsibility, charging
Facebook instead, e.g., “I feel responsible for the content of
my public posts/comments and photos posted to the public. I
feel I should not have to further manage private messages
[...] which I want to remain private and have selected as
such”. It is also interesting to note that users feel responsible
for social privacy problems and barely mention surveillance
problems [20]. Participants acknowledged being responsible
for the configuration of their privacy settings, but limited
their self-censorship practices to the public domain. They
consistently disregarded the fact that privacy settings do not
prevent the service provider (Facebook) from being able to
access all their content, both public and private. The response
of one participant nicely summarises this trend: “I would
rather friends send me private messages if they want to share
something fun with me”.
All in all, we caution that different people may have had
different interpretations of what “responsibility” means. More
studies are needed to surface further evidence of the control-
responsibility dichotomy.
B. Limitations of Facebook’s Privacy Settings (Q1, Q2)
We asked participants “Which privacy problems, if any, do
you encounter using Facebook?”. The goal of this question
was, on the one hand, to find out whether they would mention
or refer to any SNP-problems (S1) and, on the other hand, to
get a glimpse of what other problems they might be dealing
with. We posit that all responses but “None” can be effectively
used as input for improving CACTOS. For each response, we
also reflect on the potentials and shortcomings of CACTOS in
addressing these problems. The responses of the participants
can be classified in two main categories: lack of control
over information flows and lack of control over how their
information is used. Within the former category, we found
several groups of problems: Participants referred to the lack
of control over the privacy settings (“privacy settings always
seem to be reset to a lower level after each update”) and
the lack of granularity of the privacy settings (“[...] would
be very helpful to be able to decide exactly who can see
each post/friend’s post/photo/piece of info [...]”). Note that, on
Facebook, individual privacy controls are available for items
like posts, but not for others such as specific photos in an
album. Also, the ability of a user to manage the audience
of a certain post is constrained by the predefined categories
available on Facebook, e.g., one can share a post with specific
friends but it is impossible to select specific friends of friends:
one must share with all friends of friends or none of them
(same for the Public category, which does not allow to select
specific people outside Facebook). Other participants referred
to the difficulty of effectively deleting information (“even you
delete something still it can be seen by a search tool”). We
note that these are the type of issues expected to motivate the
adoption of CACTOS, in line with the reasons mentioned in
Sect. III (reasons c, d and b, respectively). However, we also
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found problems in this category that one cannot solve with
CACTOS, namely, the lack of control over somebody else’s
activities, e.g., “I am able to stop people from seeing my posts,
but not posts I’m tagged in”. Similarly, the category lack of
control over how information about them is used comprises
both problems that can and cannot be solved with CACTOS.
A couple of participants mentioned privacy problems related
to their information being processed to target advertising to
them (“my data being used to target ads at me”). One
could use CACTOS to mitigate the processing of posts for
advertisement by concealing them from the service provider
(reason a). However, CACTOS are often not intended to
prevent “Facebook tracking you across the web”. Finally, other
participants pointed out to strangers sending them messages or
friend requests (e.g., “random people message me even though
I don’t know them”, or “Some random strangers sending
me friend requests”). As yet, no CACTOS we are aware of
provides a solution to this problem.
We asked participants “What, if anything, would you add
to, modify or delete from the Facebook privacy settings?”
to assess whether they would be interested in any of the
CACTOS-properties (S1). Many participants pointed to the
lack of granularity of the settings and the fact that these settings
do not allow to control the visibility of certain items, e.g.,
“want to put limit to the photos one by one not the whole
album”, “cover photos are all public. I would change that”,
“I would make it possible to hide specific things from specific
people”. This fine-grained control over the visibility of any
specific item is one of the features of CACTOS (reason d).
Some participants pointed out to enhanced protection from
search engines, e.g., “[...] a function that makes your profile
unsearchable for a certain amount of time [...]”, “[...] that no
one can find [my information] even if googled”. Encryption
can definitely disrupt the ability of search engines to index
content. However, CACTOS are weak in the flexibility they
offer in managing disclosure decisions over time (e.g., flexible
revocation). Some participants suggested the ability “to see
who has viewed my page”, “if any random user [...] viewed
my pictures”, while another participant requested the opposite
“would never allow people to see the profiles I’ve looked
at”. In any case, CACTOS do not provide control over these
features. Some participants referred to Facebook’s terms of
service and, more specifically, to “what Facebook does with
your data”. One can use CACTOS to conceal data from the
service provider (reason a), thus preventing the collection in
the first place.
Moreover, we asked participants “What privacy issues you
have, if any, that you are not able to solve with Facebook’s
privacy settings?” (S1) followed by “Which strategies do
you use to solve those privacy issues?” (S2). Most of the
participants reported to have “none”, i.e., no issues unsolvable
with Facebook’s privacy settings. On the other hand, responses
from those participants who did have some issues can be
classified in three categories: Some participants referred to (1)
the lack of control over other people’s activities (“Friend re-
quests from strangers”, “Individuals comment inappropriately
on [my] status”). Coping strategies included “reporting [to
Facebook]”, “deleting the post” but also “nothing”. CACTOS
do not provide solutions to these problems. Other participants
referred to (2) the lack of control or knowledge on Facebook’s
uses of data (“to not sell my data to companies”, “Tracking
you across the web”, “Seeing who my ”top friends” are on
chat or on my profile” or “The adds [sic] I see in facebook
are related to even my google searches, they interfere in to
every space of mine.”). Coping strategies mentioned were “ask
explicitly if they are okay”, “Firefox add-ons”, “nothing” and
“never login in to facebook”, respectively. One could use
CACTOS to mitigate some of these problems by concealing
data from the service provider (reason a). Lastly, a couple of
participants mentioned (3) being unable to hide their cover
photos and to use self-censorship as a solution (“Only post
[...]“appropriate” cover photos [...]”). CACTOS are tailored
to address this last type of problem (reason d).
C. Reliance on the OSN Provider (Q1)
We asked participants “How concerned would you be if
Facebook changed the privacy settings?” (S1). Most partic-
ipants (83%) answered “moderately concerned”. Other re-
sponses were evenly distributed between “slightly”, “very”
and “hugely concerned”. As for changes on FB’s privacy
policy (“How concerned would you be if Facebook changed
the privacy policy?”), participants seemed to be generally
more concerned, with a shift of opinion from “moderately
concerned” to “very” and “hugely concerned.” A desire to
shield themselves from these threats could also function as
a motivation to adopt CACTOS (reason c).
D. Awareness of and Attitude towards Alternative Privacy
Controls (Q2, Q3)
We asked participants “Are you aware of any strategies or
mechanisms, currently not provided by Facebook, that can help
you better protect your privacy?” (S2, S3). All users but one
reported to be unaware of any such strategies or mechanisms.
Still, that one participant mentioned “DoNotTrack”, which
does not fall under the category of what we consider CACTOS
—rather, it is a technique to express a preference towards
online trackers [30]. We asked participants “Which strategies
or mechanisms do you know, even if you do not use them,
to prevent unintended recipients from having access to your
messages and information you send or post on Facebook?”.
Most participants (81%) responded “None”. Other participants
pointed out to strategies such as “limiting the amount of
people [added] as friends”, tightening their privacy settings
(including blocking people) and “deleting facebook”. Only one
participant mentioned “encrypting messages/posts”. Further,
we asked them “Why would you, or would you not, use such
a tool?” Most of the participants that would install such a tool
(30% of the total) provided a simple motivation for doing so:
to increase their privacy (“I like to increase my privacy”), even
if some provided more elaborate answers (“it would add an
extra layer of protection against marketering [sic] companies
and online hackers”). At this point in the questionnaire it
was obvious that privacy played a central role in the study,
thus we suspect these answers were motivated by a strong
social desirability bias [18] and we deem them irrelevant for
our study. A few other participants however added a shade
of scepticism, e.g., “All ready, I’m concerned with one such
thing I’m using. I don’t want to involve something else and
provide my data to more sources” or “if it could actually
protect me from something I needed to be protected from”.
CACTOS are typically open-source, thus under scrutiny by
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anybody. Computer scientists often rely on this property to
justify that one does not need to trust the developers, as
anybody can examine the code (and change it) to make sure it
effectively does what it is supposed to. This in turn distributes
the trust users need to place on a single developer to the
whole community. However, the general Internet user may
not be aware or willing to rely on this property. Current
CACTOS designs do not address this issue. Those participants
who responded that they would not install such tools (20%)
also declared that the tool itself could be unreliable or leak
their data (“I would not like to broadcast my privacy settings.
I would use the app only if it remains anonymous.”, “Not
sure if it is safe to install”) even suggesting that “they can
be unreliable unless facebook certifies the tool themselves”.
Other participants dismissed the usefulness of such tools as “I
control what I share and I trust facebook to a certain extent”
or “too much effort for a trivial thing”. Lastly, one participant
justified that unintended recipients collect users data because
“sometimes those recipients have to use the data to improve
facebook itself, or the community.” In short, the fact that
users take advantage of alternative, non-technical strategies
to manage their privacy, and the mistrust in the effectiveness
of alternative technical tools seem to offer little support for
adoption of technical tools to address SNP-problems (Q3).
E. Attitudes and Perceptions towards Scramble! (Q4)
After the guided tour to Scramble!, participants were
prompted to comment on their experiences with the tool. We
asked participants “Can you describe, in a few words, your
experience using Scramble!?”. They expressed a wide range of
opinions that can be classified in three groups: negative, posi-
tive and mixed responses. This categorisation is not particularly
informative, but it does reflect a heterogeneous spectrum of
perceptions. Overall, responses we deemed as negative alluded
to the lack of usability: a steep learning curve (“the learning
curve took too much time”), how cumbersome Scramble! was
to use —cumbersome was indeed a very popular word or that
Scramble! requires “too many steps [...] to send a message”.
Both positive and negative opinions similarly hinted at the lack
of usability, framing it as the main obstacle to what actually is
“a proper tool”, “a valuable tool”, “a solution to facebook’s
problem”. The perception that Scramble! was useful but only
for very private information was also recurrent, e.g., “It’s a
very great idea, but only useful for messages that really needed
to be protected”, “awesome for the people who want to send
private [i]mportant [...] text messages”. However, this notion
was also linked to poor usability, e.g., “It was effective, but too
complex to be integrated into my everyday routine. I am not
THAT concerned about my private messages to go through the
hassle”. Some participants called into question the benefits of
Scramble!, e.g., “Easy, interesting, not sure about the benefits,
though”. Lastly, positive responses described the experience
as both easy and fun (“it was fun using it and its easy [...]
too”). In summary, we cannot conclude there was a unanimous
response that reveals whether participants perceived Scramble!
as a suitable tool or not. However, ease of use seems to be the
central feature around which users judged their experience.
Further, we asked participants “What would be the ad-
vantages, if any, of using a tool like Scramble! over, or
in combination with, other privacy controls?” (S4). Many
participants (70%) gave succinct answers (“more private com-
munication”, “better privacy”) or simply repeated what they
found in the material they had been given earlier (privacy
issues arising from SNP-problems). However, some provided
more insightful answers. A couple of participants mentioned
that the advantages of using Scramble! were “None”, or that “I
wouldn’t worry so much about my Facebook messages being
in the open.” One participant wrote that “There seems to be
no advantage, as again facebook has all our public names
and email ids associated with that”. This is a fair point which
reveals the scepticism of some OSN users (despite the fact that
this particular critique reveals a flawed understanding of the
protection offered by Scramble!). On the other hand, however,
such a comment may also be interpreted as reaffirming the fact
that participants did perceive protection against Facebook as a
benefit (Q1).
Participants’ scepticism became patently notable when we
asked them “Scramble! encrypts messages before you send
or post them on Facebook. Do you think this is a secure
way to prevent unintended recipients from having access to
them?”. Even if most of them (77%) simply replied “yes”,
other participants had some reservations, e.g., “having a simple
private and public key mechanism may not be robust enough”,
“yes, kind of, I am sure they will find another way to decode
it”, “To a point... unless someone can figure it out and de-
crypt it”, “that would require a second, and third level of
encryption, which I think is illogical”. Other participants did
not see cryptography as the source of mistrust, but rather
its particular implementation on Scramble! and the people
behind it, e.g., “Probably yes, but remember we don’t know
whether scramble is a government controlled plug-in or actu-
ally developed by Facebook itself”, “no, till proper and full
information about, what scramble is, how and why it encrypts
our data”. Note however that our sample consisted of CMU
students —potentially with a solid background in computer
science—, so these answers may not be representative of most
users. Further, the study was done as revelations about NSA’s
surveillance programs were hitting headlines, which may have
led to greater scepticism towards cryptographic tools. Lastly,
some participants’ concerns derived from a misunderstanding
of how Scramble! works, e.g., “what if you accidentally send
a message to someone who has scramble but they were an
unintended recipient can they still read your message? or do
you have to add them to your contact list first?”. In fact, it does
not matter who installed Scramble! or who is on the contact list
as long as the public keys chosen to encrypt a given message
correspond to the intended recipients.
We also asked participants “What do you think are the
differences, if any, between what Scramble! does and the
privacy settings of Facebook?”. Once again, most participants
(70%) referred to the CACTOS-properties mentioned by us,
e.g., the fact that Scramble! is independent from Facebook
or that it provides greater control over their privacy settings.
Interestingly, some participants pointed out to mistaken techni-
cal or implementation details to frame those differences, e.g.,
(“it doesnt save the information on a server rather keeps it
local”, “Scramble data is saved on my computer so it protects
me from facebook itself”). In reality, only the private key
is stored locally, all (encrypted) messages are uploaded to
Facebook. The users may have also conflated OSN access
to encrypted data to being equivalent to having no access to
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the same data. Some participants also pointed to encryption,
e.g., “Encryption at the user end is a win for this tool”.
In particular, one participant mentioned that “there is no
encryption in facebook”, however, note that this is not strictly
true, as Facebook does implement SSL5, thus it is unclear
to what extent this participant understood or was aware of
the differences between using encryption as in SSL and as
in PGP. In fact, some participants admitted not being able to
understand the differences between what Scramble! does and
what the privacy settings of Facebook do, e.g., “I don’t know
if Facebook uses encryption between two individual users like
Scramble does”, “im not exactly sure of how facebooks privacy
stuff operates”.
In short, the inability to assess whether the protection
mechanism a CACTOS relies on delivers the protection it
promises may discourage users to entrust a CACTOS with the
protection of their privacy.
We further asked participants to (“Overall, explain in a
few words why you find a tool like Scramble! to be useful
or not useful”). Overall, there was a slightly greater inclina-
tion to deem Scramble! a useful tool. Participants responded
Scramble! was useful because it provided better privacy. A
couple of participants conditioned its usefulness to their own
purpose definition, namely, to protect very private messages
(“it’s useful if you are really sending private messages, prob-
ably not as useful if your messages aren’t super private”,
“maybe sometime i might have to talk about some secret
info”). Others pointed out to encryption being fun (“I like
a modicum of privacy, it is a good thing. Also encryption
is fun.”), and the feeling of security afforded by Scramble!
(“i feel more comfortable online”). Lastly, one participant
provided an innovative benefit of using Scramble!, i.e., one
we had not considered: “if you accidentally send a message
to someone it was not intended for, they won’t be able to read
it”. On the other hand, participants that found Scramble! not
useful referred to three main themes: lack of usability (“it is
too difficult to use”, “it isn’t easy enough to use”), excessive
protection (“I don’t really seem to send any such messages
which needs encryption and protection”, “I am not working
in any cove[r]t operations. So there is no “very private”
stuffs that I actually share in fb”, “i don’t send to[o] many
messages that need to be kept too private”), and scepticism
about Scramble! being really effective (“the internet itself is
not safe, either public or private key could be captured by
service providers”, “It is not efficient; people can easily hack
into accounts and read messages” or that “they are likely to be
cracked eventually”). We note that some responses combined
elements from either of the three categories, e.g., “it’s too
complicated for facebook users who just want to talk about
trivial things”, or “it is just extra steps for people if they care
enough”. Both responses suggest that a combination of lack of
usability and a excessive protection render Scramble! hardly
useful to them.
Addressing primarily those users who deemed Scramble!
“not useful”, we asked participants “Which cases, purposes
or people do you think a tool like Scramble! could be useful
for?” (S4). The most popular theme across all responses was
5Facebook announced in July 31, 2013, that they use https by default for
all Facebook users. [1]
“to send confidential information”, or “messages contain-
ing sensitive personal information” or “[...] really private
information [...]”. Some participants even went further and
saw Scramble! as a tool “for high security messages”, “[...]
something top secret”, “[...] really really secret confidential
information”. Incidentally, many participants mentioned the
word confidential although it was not present in our documents
or explanations. A couple of participants thought Scramble!
would be a tool for “[i]llegal activities”, for “criminals”, but
also for “Secret agents” and “intelligence”. Other participants
pointed out to conscious or paranoid people (“Most conscious
and concerned facebook users”, “paranoid people”). Hence,
there seems to be a mismatch between the purpose and
audience that developers have in mind when they develop
CACTOS (i.e., access control on OSNs for the general OSN
user) and those that participants in our study perceive. In
fact, very few participants thought Scramble! would be useful
for “[...] the everyday person”, “students, business people”,
“[m]yself” or “everyone!”.
Lastly, we asked participants about the elements they liked,
those which they disliked and those they missed. To the
question “What, if anything, did you like about Scramble!?”
participants replied the idea behind it, some of them being
rather vague in their responses (“[t]he main idea behind
it!”, “[t]he idea behind the product”) and others pointing
to specific benefits such as its independence from Facebook
(“[I] liked that it hides data from Facebook”, “[...] it’s nice
to not be under the thumb of organizations like Facebook”)
or implementation details (“[t]hat it keeps [...] local [the]
key”, “the encryption”). Others valued the increased security,
some participants being more convinced than others, e.g.,
“[g]uaranteed security” and “[t]he messages seemed to be
more secure; the feeling of security was there”, respectively.
Interestingly, and despite the generalised complaints about the
lack of usability, some participants reported to like the sim-
plicity of Scramble! (“It’s easy to just right click and encrypt
a message”, “Simplicity and explanation of its workings”).
In fact, to the question “What, if anything, did you dislike
about Scramble!?” almost all participants responded with a
complaint about the procedure required to use the tool or
its interface. Participants said Scramble! was “cumbersome”
(“[a] bit cumbersome to use”, “too cumbersome”), complex
(“A bit too complex”), slow (“It is a lil [sic] bit slow”, “it was
more time-consuming to send a message”), or that it required
“many steps”. Regarding its interface, participants considered
it was “clunky, unattractive”, or “GUI and ergonomics are
real bad”. They also provided suggestions as how to solve
these issues, but we discuss these in the next section. One
participant mentioned that “[b]ecause messages sent to me
were automatically scrambled, I wasn’t sure if the person sent
a scrambled message or a normal one. I’m also not sure if
anyone with scramble would be able to read a scrambled
message, or I would have to have them on my contacts list
first”. One participant asked “[w]hat if someone hacked into
my facebook?” while another wondered “[whether it would]
be possible for third parties to figure out the encryption
mechanism”. Both responses suggest a lack of transparency
and feedback that would enable a user to better understand
how Scramble! works. This contrasted with the fact that
many participants demanded a higher automation of the whole
process. We elaborate on this tension between feedback and
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transparency against automation in the next section. Finally, we
asked participants “What features did you miss in Scramble!
or you think that such a tool should have?”). In short, most of
their demands correlated with what they did not like about the
tool. However, participants who were positive about Scramble!
pointed out to additional features such as being able to encrypt
photos and also provided specific suggestions on how to
improve its usability, which we discuss in the next section.
SUS: In addition to the questions above, participants were
asked to fill in the standard questionnaire SUS. The average
score for Scramble! fell barely above the middle score (M
= 52.9, SD = 18.35, MAX = 95, MIN = 15). This supports
the previously reported variety of attitudes of the participants
towards the tool, its workings and its interface.
VII. DISCUSSION
Based on the study, we can be confident that our partic-
ipants’ privacy preferences and attitudes are not completely
divergent from the objectives and design principles that in-
form CACTOS. Participants reported several privacy concerns
related to SNP-problems (Q1) that would provide them with
plausible reasons to adopt a CACTOS. Prior to the study,
we speculated that users may not adopt CACTOS because
of the responsibility burden that comes with greater control
over privacy settings (Q2). This is a complex hypothesis that
needs further investigation. We observe that the complexity and
obscurity of the cryptographic mechanisms CACTOS feature
may in fact leave users worse off. By trying to protect their
privacy with tools they do not understand, users may end up
actually losing control over their information flows.
In fact, participants found that CACTOS like Scramble!
provide too great a degree of protection, at too high a usability
cost, to match their actual needs (Q4). We conjecture that
these attitudes may be motivated by the perception people
have of cryptography. The guided tour to Scramble! included
an explanation of the cryptographic mechanisms Scramble!
relies on, because we considered that participants needed some
information in order to minimally understand the initialisation
process (i.e., why they needed to generate cryptographic keys).
However, had the participants not heard about cryptography
and just about the CACTOS-properties provided by Scramble!,
would their perception still be the same? To what extent
their perception of cryptography biased their perception of
Scramble!? It is not trivial to study whether the formulation
of how the tool works or the participants’ perceptions of
cryptography inform their reactions. This as an interesting
future research question.
Moreover, another factor that influenced users’ attitudes
towards Scramble! is the perception that what they share on
OSNs is not sensitive enough to require encryption. Partic-
ipants reported to control what they share; even to refrain
from sharing very sensitive information on Facebook. These
responses are in accordance with widespread use of self-
censorship to mitigate the risk of privacy breaches reported
in previous studies [16], [22], [29], and may help explaining
why participants do not opt for technical tools to overcome the
Facebook’s privacy settings limitations they pointed to (Q3).
Hence, it would be a challenge to explore whether the use
of CACTOS enables or motivates less repressed communica-
tion practices. Such a study may be especially difficult, as
participants may not be truthful about their self-reported self-
censorship practices, and may in fact disclose the very kind of
sensitive information they thought CACTOS would be useful
for (S4).
Even if people agree with the fundamental reasons why
one would use a CACTOS, would it be sensible for them
to use them? Our results suggest no. Participants showed a
great deal of scepticism towards the effectiveness of CACTOS.
Some participants believed that by using CACTOS they would
have to trust the tool developers instead (or on top) of the
current OSN provider. For other participants, the complexity
and obscurity of cryptography failed to reassure them that
CACTOS deliver the protection they promise. Our participants
signaled that they are unlikely to use such a tool if they doubt
whether it delivers the protection promised. This is further
aggravated if such a tool is seen as a hassle. Usability for
security [35] is thus key in fostering the adoption of CACTOS.
A. Potential Recommendations to CACTOS Designers
Users need to be reassured that CACTOS are effective and
deliver the protection they promise. Transparency is therefore
a key element to be considered when designing CACTOS.
Designers should aim at communicating better the workings
of cryptography, e.g., through the use of mental models and
metaphors, as was previously suggested in the literature [9],
[13]. Beyond the utmost importance of a usable interface,
attractive manuals could also help. In fact, participants missed
in Scramble! “a manual? [...] the printed instructions helped
the most”, and that “[the manuals we gave them] are not
available [in Scramble!] by default.” Moreover, it may be more
attractive to communicate the benefits of cryptography in terms
other than those informed by security, such as attack, secret
or confidential, that keep reinforcing the widespread idea that
cryptography is only for top-secret use.
Moreover, all trust issues that users may have with an
OSN provider, are also relevant for CACTOS developers. The
study participants raised concerns with respect to having to
trust yet another entity with their data. While Scramble! does
not collect users’ posts or communication patterns, users have
to rely on the Scramble! developer community to provide a
tool that works and is well maintained. This is a challenge
for CACTOS like Scramble! that are developed by a small
community of researchers and depend on the availability of
incoming funds. Further, OSN providers may enhance their
trustworthiness through quality of service and branding ac-
tivities. The independence and transparency of CACTOS is
imminent in building trust in them, yet it may be interesting
to explore how OSN providers can contribute to supporting
the availability and use of CACTOS .
Participants complained about how cumbersome Scramble!
was, the extra steps they needed to perform “just to send a
single message” and how slow it was (“make it fast!”). As a
solution to all these problems, participants expressed a desire
for more automation, e.g., “there should be a function (like a
switch) that turns [encryption] on throughout a conversation,
so that the user doesn’t need to keep scrambling each line”,
“[a tool like Scramble! should have] automatic encryption”
or “automatic [encryption] as you type”. Automation would
indeed release users from the burden of dealing with cryptog-
raphy. However, more studies should further explore to what
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extent better interfaces can be designed without resorting to
automation, as the latter is likely to diminish users’ oversight of
the security mechanisms. In fact, we must be cautious about the
amount of automation in a security tool, as this usually comes
at the expense of better control for the user, e.g., deciding
which keys are to be used to encrypt a message and securely
storing private keys. Developing a tool that automatically infers
the recipients of a message and manages keys is a challenging
problem, if not an additional vulnerability from the point of
view of privacy protection.
However, if users prefer not to get familiar with cryp-
tographic protocols, and designers do not use proper com-
munication strategies (e.g., mental models) that make tools
intuitive and easy to manage by the general Internet user,
automation is unavoidable. Future research should explore, on
the one hand, how to securely automate some tasks and, on
the other hand, how to better engage users in the decision-
making required by CACTOS by leveraging transparency and
feedback mechanisms. Users should understand the principles
and basic workings of the tools they are using or they will
most surely fail to use them properly. In the case of privacy
and security tools, this issue is especially critical.
We finally conclude that there is still a lot of work to do in
the development of CACTOS to avoid putting extra burdens
on the users while mitigating their privacy concerns.
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